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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 860063

v.
Category No, 1

DOUGLAS CARTER,
Defendant-Apellant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether this Court should grant rehearing because it
overlooked statutory and case law supporting the State
introducing at the penalty phase of a capital case statutory
aggravation that was not proved at guilt phase.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A jury convicted defendant of first degree murder and
sentenced him to death.

This Court affirmed defendant's

conviction in State v. Carter, case no. 860063 (filed May 12,
1989).

Due to the possibility that an erroneous jury instruction

on one of the aggravating circumstances at guilt phase affected
the jury's ability to reach a fair and impartial decision on the
penalty, this Court remanded the case to the District Court for a
new penalty hearing.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The State agrees with the facts set forth in the
Court'8 opinion contained in Appendix A of this petition.

INTRODUCTION
In Brown v. Pickard, 4 Utah 292, 294, 11 P. 512 (1886),
this Court set forth the standard for determining whether a
petition for rehearing should be granted:
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be
made. We must be convinced that the court
failed to consider some material point in the
case, or that it erred in its conclusions, or
that some matter has been discovered which
was unknown a the time of the hearing.
(Citation omitted.)

In Cumminqs v. Nelson, 42 Utah 157, 172-73,

129 P. 619, 624 (1913), the Court stated:
to make an application for a rehearing is a
matter of right, and we have no desire to
discourage the practice of filing petitions
for rehearings in proper cases.. When this
court, however, has considered and decided
all of the material questions involved in a
case, a rehearing should not be applied for,
unless we have misconstrued or overlooked
some material fact or facts, or have
overlooked some statute or decision which may
affect the result, or that we have based the
decision on some wrong principle of law, or
have either misapplied or overlooked
something which materially affects the
result. . . . If there are some reasons,
however, such as we have indicated above, or
other good reasons, a petition for rehearing
should be promptly filed and, if it is
meritorious, its form will in no case be
scrutinized by this Court.
The argument portion of this brief will demonstrate that, based
on these standards, the State's petition for rehearing is
properly before the Court and should be granted.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The opinion in this case implies that the State may not
introduce evidence of statutory aggravation at the penalty phase
that was not proven at the guilt phase of a capital trial.
-2-

This

implication is contrary to the capital sentencing statute that
allows the State to introduce all relevant aggravating evidence
including evidence as to the nature of the crime and evidence of
aggravation defined in the first degree murder statute.

There is

no case law supporting a finding that the State must offer and
prove aggravating factors at guilt phase in order to rely on it
at penalty phase simply because the factor is one of the
enumerated statutory aggravating factors.

Indeed, the case law

supports the State's position and justifies a rehearing in this
case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE MAY INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF STATUTORY
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES AT PENALTY PHASE
THAT WERE NOT INTRODUCED OR PROVEN AT GUILT
PHASE OF A CAPITAL TRIAL.
In State v. Carter, case no. 860063, slip op. at 15
(filed May 12, 1989) this Court stated:
we remand for new sentencing proceedings. In
doing so, it is to be observed that in State
v. Tuttle, decided after the submission of
this case, we also discussed the application
of subsection (l)(q)* However, that case
does not apply here since we conclude that
the jury was not properly instructed on the
subsection (l)(q) aggravating circumstance at
the guilt phase and it would be improper to
make reference to that statutory aggravating
circumstance in the penalty phase on remand.
(Footnotes omitted, emphasis added.) While the State agrees that
the jury was improperly instructed at guilt phase on the (l)(q)
aggravating circumstance, the State disagrees with this Court's
implication, without citation to any authority, in the
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highlighted portion of the excerpt above that the penalty phase
jury cannot be properly instructed and requested to consider
statutory aggravating circumstances not proven at guilt phase.
If allowed to stand, this misstatement of the law will affect not
only the penalty rehearing in this case, but may impact future
capital cases.

Because this Court either overlooked or

misinterpreted existing statutory and case law regarding what
evidence is admissible at penalty phase, rehearing should be
granted.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2) (Supp. 1988) which
establishes the sentencing procedures for capital cases provides,
in pertinent part:
In these sentencing proceedings, evidence may
be presented as to any matter the court deems
relevant to sentence, including but not
limited to the nature and circumstances of
the crime, the defendant's character,
background, history, mental and physical
condition, and any other facts in aggravation
or mitigation of the penalty. Any evidence
the court deems to have probative force may
be received regardless of its admissibility
under the exclusionary rules of evidence.
The state's attorney and the defendant shall
be permitted to present argument for or
against sentence of death. Aggravating
circumstances shall include those as outlined
in 76-5-202. . . •
This section contemplates a wide-ranging sentencing hearing that
is not limited in scope to the statutory aggravating factors
proven at guilt phase.
Court has approved.

A practice the United States Supreme

See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203-04

(1976) (far ranging argument in capital sentencing hearing wisely
utilized - preferable not to impose restrictions). The State may
introduce €*vidence under § 76-3-207 "including but not limited to
-4-

the nature and circumstances of the crime" and including the
factors listed in Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-202 (Supp. 1988).
Theoretically, the State could choose at the outset of
a capital case to charge and to prove at guilt phase only one of
several existing statutory aggravating circumstances and reserve
the remaining statutory aggravation for the penalty phase.
Nothing in the language of the statute limits the statutory
factors that may be considered by the jury regarding the penalty
to those relied on at guilt phase. As this Court stated in State
v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1259 (Utah 1988), "[t]he only
restriction on the admission of [relevant aggravating] evidence
is that it must not be unfairly prejudicial to the accused."

The

Court further noted that a capital defendant may discover the
nature of the aggravating factors the State intends to rely on at
the penalty hearing by filing a request for a bill of
particulars.

Icl. at 1261. This statement presupposes that there

will be evidence presented at penalty phase that is not charged
in the information and, therefore, not proven as an element of
the crime of first degree murder at guilt phase.

Moreover, this

Court held that adequate notice of statutory aggravating factors
is provided by S 76-5-202 in the face of a capital defendant's
claim that he was not given adequate notice of the aggravation
relied upon in his capital trial. Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d
816, 822 (Utah 1980).

Thus, a capital defendant cannot claim

that allowing the State to reserve some statutory aggravation for
the penalty phase denies him notice of what factors the State
intends to rely on.

-5-

There is no case law establishing that, merely because
a factor is statutorily defined as aggravating, the State may
only rely on it at penalty phase if it was proven to exist beyond
a reasonable doubt at guilt phase. All the State is required to
prove at guilt phase is the existence of one statutory
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.
op. at 13.

Carter, slip

If for one reason or another the State chooses not to

charge one or more other statutory aggravating factors, the use
of these factors should not be precluded at penalty phase merely
because they are statutorily defined and may also be an
independent basis for a finding of guilt.
The Legislature has determined that the factors defined
in S 76-5-202 are aggravating and warrant consideration for the
death penalty.

State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 571 (Utah 1987).

In determining whether the State should be allowed to present
evidence of these statutory factors at the penalty phase even
where the factors were not the basis for a determination of
guilt, this Court should consider that one of the goals of the
criminal code is to M[p]rescribe penalties which are
proportionate to the seriousness of the offenses,M Utah Code Ann.
S 76-1-104(3) (1978), and that "[a]ll provisions of th[e] code
. . . shall be construed according to the fair import of their
terms to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law and
general purposes of S 76-1-104"
(1978).

Utah Code Ann. $ 76-1-106

Where the Legislature has already determined that the

factors enumerated in S 76-5-202 are always considered to be
aggravating, the jury must be BO instructed.

-6-

To do otherwise

would be to ignore the general purposes of the code.

Absent

instructions on all of the statutory aggravating circumstances
the State alleges exist, the jury cannot prescribe a penalty
which is proportionate to the crime.
Even though the jury at defendant's guilt phase was
improperly instructed on the (l)(q) aggravating circumstance, the
State should not be precluded from proving, if it is able, the
aggravation at penalty phase and offering a correct instruction.
The effect of this Court's decision not to rely on the (l)(q)
circumstance in affirming the first degree murder conviction is
as if the jury were never instructed on (l)(q).

Defendant would

not, therefore, be prejudiced by an instruction that would allow
the jury, for purposes of penalty only, to consider the (l)(q)
factor.
The State is not suggesting that the new penalty jury
would be instructed that the (l)(q) aggravating circumstance was
found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt by the guilt phase jury.
They would merely be instructed that the Legislature has
determined that it is a statutory aggravating circumstance that
they may consider in determining the appropriate penalty and
deciding whether the totality of the aggravation outweighs the
totality of the mitigation.

Of course, the State would still

have to marshal facts at the penalty phase supporting the
application of the aggravating factor# as correctly defined.
The United States Supreme Court, in Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862 (1983), found that a capital sentencing jury was not
prejudiced when it considered an aggravating factor at the

-7-

sentencing hearing that was not proper at guilt phase because it
failed to narrow, for the purposes of guilt, the pool of
murderers eligible for the death penalty.

Nevertheless, the

Court stated that the factor could be considered for sentencing
since it was also listed as a factor bearing on sentence in a
separate sentencing statute.

Id. at 886. The Court had

previously found that Georgia's capital procedures, like Utah's,
performed the narrowing function at guilt phase by requiring a
finding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance to
convict of first degree murder.

Id. at 879.

The result in Stephens was effectively that a statutory
aggravating circumstance that was not the basis for the
determination of guilt was used by the jury for sentencing.

This

is similar to what the State argues should occur in this case.
Defendant has already been convicted of first degree murder under
one valid statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable
doubt.

The invalidation of the (l)(q) instruction is as if it

was never introduced or proven at guilt phase because this Court
affirmed defendant's conviction solely on the other statutory
aggravating factor.

The jury will now consider, only for

purposes of sentencing all appropriate aggravation described in a
separate sentencing statute.

The sentencing statute specifically

refers back to the factors listed in the first degree murder
statute as also being appropriate for sentencing.

Because there

is no limitation to the aggravation that was the basis for the
finding of guilt, the jury should be allowed to consider whether
the facts of the crime were Especially heinous, atrocious,
cruel, or exceptionally depraved.11
-8-

In fact, defendant will have an advantage that Stephens
did not:

Defendant's sentencing jury will not be the same jury

that heard the erroneous instruction defining the (l)(q)
circumstance.

If it can be harmless error to allow the penalty

imposed by a previously tainted jury to stand, then it cannot be
prejudicial to allow a new jury, properly instructed, to consider
statutorily defined aggravation.

Because the first degree murder

sentencing statute and relevant case law support the State
introducing at penalty phase evidence in aggravation not
introduced or proven at guilt phase, the implication in this case
to the contrary is inaccurate.

A rehearing should be granted.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to grant rehearing.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^//l

day of May, 1989.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

/ /

SANDRA L. <£<K)GREri

'-^ Assistant Attorney General
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EXHIBIT A

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter*

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Douglas Carter,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. 860063
F I L E D
May 12, 1989
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

Fourth District, Utah County
The Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen
Attorneys;

Gary Weight, James P. Rupper, Thomas H. Means,
Provo, for defendant
R. Paul Van Dam, Sandra L. Sjogren, Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff
Lionel H. Frankel, Salt Lake City, for the ACLU

HALL# Chief Justice:
On February 27, 1985, Eva Oleson vas found dead in
her home. Following an investigation, defendant vas arrested
in Nashville, Tennessee, and charged with the murder. After
confessing to officers that he committed the crime, defendant
vas extradited to Provo, Utah, vhere he vas tried and convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death.
Defendant's original appellate counsel filed tvo
briefs on appeal. After defendemt filed a pro se motion vith
this Court, replacement counsel vas appointed to brief additional issues defendant raised. Also, the American Civil
Liberties Union vas permitted to file an amicus brief in this
case.
In reaching the issues on appeal, ve reiterate that
[t]his Court vill review errors raised and
briefed on appeal in death penalty cases,
even though no proper objection vas made
at trial, but vill reverse a conviction
based upon such errors only if they meet
the manifest and prejudicial error
standard. In addition, this Court has the
power to notice manifest ('palpable*)

error apparent in the
conviction based upon
error is prejudicial,
error is not objected
assigned on appeal.1

record and correct a
the same if the
even though such
to at trial or

In addition to correctly reflecting this Court's
responsibility and approach in reviewing death penalty cases,
this rule also impliedly recognizes another established
principle generally applicable to all civil and criminal
cases, namely, that this Court need not analyze and address
in writing each and every argument, issue, or claim raised
and properly before us on appeal. Rather, it is a maxim of
appellate review that the nature and extent of an opinion
rendered by 2 an appellate court is largely discretionary with
that court.
This was essentially the view of the North Carolina
Supreme Court in stating:
It is our duty to decide all cases brought
before us, but whether a written opinion
shall be filed is entirely within our
discretion. A failure to do so is in no
sense a reflection upon counsel, nor is it
any criterion as to the ability or learning with which the case may have been
argued. It simply means that we do not
think it necessary. . . .
If the essential principles upon which a case depends
have been already settled, we can add but
little, if anything, to what has already
been said; while the discussion of questions not essential to its determination,
even if argued by counsel, may well be
omitted in the interest of time and space.3
Similarly, in holding that California's constitution
did not require its appellate courts to 'set forth and
dispose of, seriatim, each and every item which appellant's
counsel chooses to characterize as an 'issue' in the case,'
the California Court of Appeals eloquently stated:
T. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 553 (Utah 1987) (emphasis
added; footnotes omitted).
2. See 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal 4 Error, f 901, at 338 and cases
cited therein.
3. Parker v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 133 N.C. 335, 337, 45
S.E. 658, 658 (1903)} cf. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 90 Ariz. 379, 381, 368 P.2d 450, 452 (1962) (en banc)
(*[T]he decision need not contain a seriatim rebuttal of
points made or arguments advanced. Enlargements upon the
ground of decision ought to be limited to matters where areas
of genuine dispute exist.*)*

Our statement that these other
contentions 'did not merit discussion' is
an indication that we necessarily and
carefully analyzed the contentions in
order to reach that conclusion. . . .

In an era in which there is concern
that the quality of justice is being
diminished by appellate backlog with its
attendant delay, which in turn contributes
to a lack of finality of judgment, it
behooves us as an appellate court to "get
to the heart" of cases presented and
dispose of them expeditiously. Unnecessary verbiage and redundant literary
exercises are counter-productive.4
In applying this principle to cases before us, we
have, after fully considering the substance of a particular
claim raised on appeal, summarily (and often without written
analysis) dismissed the same as meritless or of no effect.5
Use of this rule in capital punishment and other cases
continues to be appropriate and important in acknowledging
established principles while enabling this Court, after fair
and comprehensive review, to expeditiously focus judicial
resources and energy on those critical or outcomedeterminative issues which may be raised in any given case
and/or which have not in substance been previously urged upon
this Court and rejected.6 Accordingly, after fully reviewing
every claim raised in the instant case, we discuss at length
only those issues critical to this appeal.7
4k People v. Rojas, 118 Cal. App. 3d 278, 290, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 91, 92-93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); cf^ Ex parte Royall,
117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886) (*'[T]o dispose of the party as law
and justice require' does not deprive the court of discretion
as to the time and mode in which it will exert the powers
conferred upon it." (Emphasis added.)) (federal court's
power in habeas corpus cases to deal with federal constitutional violation of defendant held in state custody).
5. See, e.g.. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 460, 489 (Utah
1988) (defendant's claims reviewed and dismissed without
lengthy analysis); State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1261
(Utah 1988) ("We have considered every one of [defendant's]
other claims and find each of them to be without merit.").
6. See Bishop, 753 P.2d at 460; cf^ Utah R. Crim. P. 26(10)
(death sentence cases shall be placed on the Supreme Court's
calendar for expeditious determination).
7. Although in raising his claims defendant relies on both
the United States and Utah Constitutions, he does not
(Continued on page 4.)
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Defendant claims that the trial court erred by not
suppressing his confession. Several months after the murder
occurred, Tennessee police officers received information from
an anonymous source that defendant was at a female friend's
Nashville residence. After confirming that defendant was
wanted in connection with the case, officers proceeded to the
friend's residence and there arrested defendant.
At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, a
Nashville police officer testified that he gave defendant a
Miranda warning after arresting him. At the police station
later that day, he again advised defendant of his Miranda
rights and obtained a written waiver of those rights from
him. The officer then questioned defendant for several hours
over the next two days; during those times, defendant was
allowed to smoke, drink water, and use restroom facilities.
The officer testified that he did not threaten
defendant. He also denied that he used the friend's situation
or that of her children in any manner to intimidate defendant
into confessing, stating that he offered information about
her status only in response to defendant's frequent questions
regarding her.
A police officer from the Provo police department
was sent to Tennessee to extradite defendant. At the
suppression hearing, the Provo officer testified that when he
interviewed defendant in Tennessee, he advised defendant of
his Miranda rights and soon obtained a confession from him.
Thereafter, the officer apparently dictated the confession,
stopping after every few lines to ask defendant whether what
was dictated was accurate. The confession was then reduced
to writing and signed. Although acknowledging at the
suppression hearing that he had interviewed defendant's
friend prior to questioning defendant, the officer denied
making any threats or promises to defendant concerning her.
In contrast, defendant testified that he never
received Miranda warnings from the Nashville or the Provo
officer and that he could not recall signing written waivers
of his constitutional rights. Defendant did acknowledge,
however, that his signature appeared to be on documents
waiving those rights* On appeal, he reiterates his claim
that the officers repeatedly threatened that his friend
(Footnote 7 continued.)
specifically contend that the state and federal analyses
differ* Therefore, pursuant to our prescribed standard of
review in death penalty cases, we treat defendant's claims as
based only upon federal constitutional provisions. See
Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1247 n.5 (citing State v. Ashe, 745
P.2d 1255, 1257 11.2 (Utah 1987)).

would be charged with a felony, go to prison, and be separated
from her children unless he confessed.
In State v. Bishop,e we recently noted that the
State bears the burden of proving by at least a preponderance
of the evidence that a defendant's confession is voluntary.9
Voluntariness is determined by the totality of the circumstances of the accused and his or her interrogation.10
Applying this standard, we have examined the record and
reviewed the totality of the circumstances and now conclude
that defendant's statements were voluntarily made. 11 The
trial court was presented with significantly different
accounts of the circumstances of defendant's confession.
However, defendant has not shown that the court abused its
discretion in assessing the evidence presented and drawing a
reasonable conclusion therefrom.12
Defendant further claims that the court erred in
admitting his confession, given the manner in which it was
dictated. He also contends that the prosecutor's statements
which attributed to defendant the specific words of the
confession that the Provo officer dictated undermined his
constitutional right not to testify and denied the court a
true version of his statement, all of which substantially
prejudiced his trial.
After reviewing the record, we are convinced that
there is no proof to support a determination that any
significant item was omitted from the statement, that
defendant's rights were violated, or that he was prejudiced
by the prosecutor's comments. In fact, defendant's own
detailed statements to two other witnesses immediately after
the crime parallel and substantially support the confession
given to the police. Further, defendant signed the document,
and he was not denied a full and fair opportunity to crossexamine the officers concerning the accuracy of the writing
as a reflection of his oral confession.13
8. 753 P.2d 439.
9. Id^ at 463-64.
10. Id.
11. Id^ at 464 & n.76.
12. Id^ at 463-64; State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 392 (Utah
1986)•
13. United States v. Johnson, 529 F.2d 581, 584-85 (8th
Cir.), cert, denied, 426 U.S. 909 (1976) ("A statement which
is reduced to writing by one other than the accused is
generally admissible where the accused reads it over and
signs it."); Hommer v. State, 657 P.2d 172, 175 (Ofcla. Crim.
App. 1983) (defendant did not allege or prove that any
significant item was omitted from statement, and defendant
signed the document as her statement of confession) f see also
(Continued on page 6.)
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While we hold that admission of the confession was
not prejudicial error, we do not sanction the particular
manner in which it was recorded in this case. In Bishop,
that defendant's confession, together with statements made by
the police officers, was recorded verbatim. This process not
only helped insure that the defendant's confession was not
coerced, but also provided both the trial court and appellate
courts with the correct tools for effectively and efficiently
reviewing the defendant's contentions, as well as the
totality of the circumstances of his confession.14 Such a
process guarantees that constitutional rights are protected
and justice is effected. Nevertheless, while the dictation
process that occurred in this case could conceivably amount,
in other instances, to deprivation of a defendant's constitutional rights, that was not the case here.
Next, we turn to defendant's claim that the
prosecutor indirectly commented on defendant's failure to
testify at trial and suggested to the jury that his silence
implied guilt. Defendant refers to the following comment
which the prosecutor made in his summation to the jury during
the guilt phase of trial:
I heard no evidence, evidence, [sic] from
the witness stand about coercion or about
inducing somebody to say anything about
something that didn't happen. I heard no
evidence that supports any other theory in
this case than the theory that was presented by the State of Utah, that he's
guilty of first degree murder.
As noted in State v. Tillman,15 a prosecutor's
direct reference to a defendant's decision not to testify is
always a violation of that defendant's fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination. Indirect reference to a
defendant's failure to testify is also constitutionally
impermissible if the comment was manifestly intended to be or
was of such a character that the jury would naturally and
necessarily construe it to be a comment on the defendant's
failure to testify.16
While clearly not a direct reference, we do not
believe after reviewing the record that the statement in
question would naturally and necessarily be construed by the
(Footnote 13 continued.)
State v. Morris, 83 Or. App. 429, 441-42, 163 P. 567, 571
(1917) (by signing and adopting language of prepared
confession, defendant makes it his own).
14. See generally Bishop, 753 P. 2d at 460-67.
15. 750 P.2d 546.
16. Id. at 554.
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jury as a comment on defendant's silence. Indeed, the
comment was made in the context of focusing the jury's
attention on defendant's confession, which, under the
circumstances of this case, ve have concluded was properly
admitted. Also, the passage quoted could refer to the lack
of any evidence elicited from witnesses or from officers
present during defendant's confession contradicting the
State's theory of the case. Lastly, the statement was
isolated, and the trial judge specifically instructed the
jury that *[t]he fact that [defendant] has not taken the
witness stand must not be taken as an indication of his
guilt, nor should you indulge in any presumption or inference
adverse to [him] by reason thereof." Accordingly, defendant's
claim is without merit.17
Defendant elsewhere contends that he was prejudiced
by the court's decision to allow the Provo officer to remain
at the prosecution table throughout the proceedings and to
then testify for the State although the exclusionary rule was
in effect.
Rule 615 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states:
At the request of a party the court
shall order witnesses excluded so that
they cannot hear the testimony of other
witnesses, and it may make the order of
its own motion. This rule does not
authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is
a natural person, or (2) an officer or
employee of a party which is not a natural
person designated as its representative by
its attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential
to the presentation of his cause.
On appeal, defendant neither specifically contends
that the officer's presence at counsel table during trial
offended the purpose of the exclusionary rule nor explicitly
claims that the officer's presence did not properly meet the
"party representative" exception to the exclusionary principles enumerated in rule 615(2) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.18 Instead, he surmises that he was prejudiced by
_
S e e Tillman, 750 P.2d at 555.
18. Immediately after the jury was selected, defendant moved
to invoke the exclusionary rule. Informed that the officer
would testify as a witness for the prosecution, the trial
court acknowledged and defendant acquiesced in the fact that
the officer was the designated representative of the State in
this case, and the court allowed him to sit at counsel
table. The court stated:
(Continued on page 8.)
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the fact that the officer's presence possibly indicated to
the jury that the government placed its integrity and
prestige behind that witness, thus vouching for his
credibility. We disagree.
Our above-noted rule is identical to rule 615 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which has been interpreted by many
federal courts. In United States v. Williams,1* the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals held:
Rule 615 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
does not authorize the exclusion of a
government officer or employee who has
been designated as its representative.
Further, it is a matter within the
discretion of the trial court whether to
permit the government's representative to
testify, even though the witness sat at
the counsel's table throughout the trial.
In the absence of any specific showing of
prejudice to [the defendant] from the
action of the trial court, we find no
abuse of discretion.20
(Footnote 18 continued.)
I understand, Officer Pierpont you
want to keep with you at the table, do
you, [Prosecutor) Watson?
Mr. Watson: Yes, please, your Honor.
The Court: All right, all of you
[witnesses] other than Officer Pierpont,
who are present in the court, if you will
please step outside the court.
Thereafter, the court explained the purpose of the exclusionary rule and admonished the witnesses concerning its scope.
Regarding the officer, the court noted, "The State is entitled
to keep one principal witness at the counsel table.' While
this latter statement did not accurately describe the
officer's designation as the State's representative under
rule 615, the court did not err in permitting him to remain in
the courtroom and testify in this case. See infra notes 20-21
and accompanying text. Inasmuch as the scope and applicability
of rule 615(2) and (3) are not before us for review, we do not
address additional issues related thereto.
19. 604 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1979).
20. Id. at 1115 (citations omitted); see also United States
v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 773-74 (4th Cir. 1983) (a government
investigative agent involved in a criminal prosecution falls
within the rule 615 exception); United States v. Jones, 687
F.2d 1265, 1267-68 (8th Cir. 1982) (*[T]here is nothing in the
cases or legislative history of the rule that suggests state
or local officers should be treated differently than federal
(Continued on page 9.)
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Also, in regard to prosecutorial vouching for
witnesses, it has been stated:
"Attempts to bolster a witness by vouching
for his credibility are normally improper
and error." The test for improper
vouching is whether the jury could
reasonably believe that the prosecutor was
indicating a personal belief in the
witness' credibility. This test may be
satisfied in two ways. Pirst, the
prosecution may place the prestige of the
government behind the witness, by making
explicit personal assurances of the
witness' credibility. Secondly, a
prosecutor may implicitly vouch for the
witness veracity by indicating that
information not presented to the jury
supports the testimony. 21
In view of the above principles, defendant has not
demonstrated how he was actually prejudiced by the fact that
the officer sat at counsel table and testified for the State
or how defendant's particular situation justifies a change
from the established rule in such cases. Also, defendant has
not alleged and we find no support for a conclusion that the
prosecution cloaked the officer with the State's integrity
and prestige by either making "explicit personal assurances"
of his veracity or indicating that information not presented
to the jury supported his testimony. 22 Accordingly, we
conclude that defendant was not prejudiced and the trial
(Footnote 20 continued.)
officers."); People v. Cheeks, 682 P.2d 484, 485-86 (Colo.
1984) (the rule which governs sequestration prohibits
exclusion of an officer or an employee of a nonnatural party
who has been designated as its representative); cf. Geders v.
United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87 (1976) ("The judge's power to
control the progress and, within the limits of the adversary
system, the shape of the trial includes broad power to
sequester witnesses before, during, and after their
testimony.").
21. United States v. Sims, 719 F.2d 375, 377-78 (11th Cir.
1983), cert, denied, 465 U.S. 1034 (1984) (citations omitted)
(quoting United States v. Bills, 547 F.2d 863, 869 (5th Cir.
1977)), quoted in United States v. Dennis, 786 F.2d 1029, 1046
(11th Cir. 1986); accord United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d
530, 533-34 (9th Cir* 1980), quoted in State v. Salcido, 140
Ariz. 342, 344, 681 P.2d 925, 927 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); Cf.
Schlatter v. McCarthy, 113 Utah 543, 557, 196 P. 2d 968, 975
(1948) (civil case stating general rule that a party who calls
a witness thereby vouches for his or her veracity).
22• Sims, 719 F.2d at 377-78.
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court did not err in allowing the officer to sit at counsel
table and testify at trial in this case.23
He next address defendant's claim that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel in violation of both his
state and federal constitutional rights. In Strickland v,
Washington,24 the United States Supreme Court established the
standard for determining the existence of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. In order to prevail on such a
claim, a defendant must show, first, that his or her counsel
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner,
which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and, second, that counsel's
performance prejudiced the defendant.25 This Court has
applied that standard in several cases.26 In several of
those cases, we followed one course advised but not
required27 by the Court in Strickland:
[A] court need not determine whether
counsel's performance was deficient before
examining the prejudice suffered by the
defendant as a result of the alleged
deficiencies. . . • If it is easier to
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,
which we expect will often be so, that
course should be followed. Courts should
strive to ensure that ineffectiveness
claims not become so burdensome to defense
23. See State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986)
(clearly erroneous standard of review applies in considering
trial court's ruling on admissibility of testimonial and other
evidence).
24. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
25. Id^ at 687-88.
26. See, e.g., State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 191-92 (Utah
1988); State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019, 1023-24 (Utah 1987);
State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam);
State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985) (per curiam).
27. Strickland does not require that a defendant claiming
ineffective assistance must show that the conduct prejudiced
his case before the reviewing court will consider whether
specific conduct falls below the required standard of
objective reasonableness. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
While this Court may choose at times to~deal with ineffective
assistance claims by first reviewing the likely-prejudice-ofthe-outcome issue, that decision does not prevent this Court
in other instances from first considering the issue of whether
specific conduct falls below the required standard of
objective reasonableness. Any implications to the contrary
are in error* See, e.g., Archuleta, 747 P.2d at 1023;
Frame, 723 P.2d at 405.
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counsel that the entire criminal
justice
system suffers as a result.28
After reviewing defendant's asserted claims of error
in this regard, we conclude that most of his allegations of
prejudice are wholly speculative29 and in no way give rise to
the conclusion that "but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different."30
Additionally, defendant has not sufficiently shown how the
decisions made by trial counsel were not merely tactical
choices or how counsel's performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment.31 Other claims
are clearly not supported by the record. For example, there
is no support for the contention that counsel failed to
elicit evidence relevant to whether defendant was afforded
his sixth amendment right to counsel at the time his confession was taken. Instead, defendant twice acknowledged and
voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Documents to this
effect stated in part:
You have the right to talk to a
lawyer for advice before we ask you any
questions and to have him with you during
questioning.
28.
29.

466 U.S. at 697.
In Frame, 723 F.2d at 406, the Court noted:
Defendant claims that he was
inadequately prepared as a witness and
that no other witnesses were called on
his behalf. These contentions are also
inadequately supported on appeal. Defendant does not explain how his testimony or
the purported lack of advance preparation
was prejudicial to him. He does not
explain what his testimony would have been
had he been adequately prepared. Also,
defendant does not identify what other
persons should have been called as
witnesses or how their testimony was
essential to his defense.
(Citations omitted.)
30. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also Codianna v.
Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983) ("[Prejudice means
that without counsel#8 error there was a 'reasonable
likelihood that there would have been a different result."
(Quoting State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1979)).
31. Supra note 25; State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 91 (Utah
1982) ("Trial tactics lie within the prerogative of counsel
and may not be dictated by his [or her] client. Decisions as
to what witnesses to call, what objections to make, and, by
and large, what defenses to interpose are generally left to
the professional judgment of counsel."), cert, denied, 459
U.S. 988 (1982).
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If you cannot afford a lawyer, one
will be appointed for you before any
questioning if you wish. If you decide to
answer questions now without a lawyer
present, you will still have the right to
stop answering at any tine. You also have
the right to stop answering at any time
until you talk to a lawyer.
Waiver of Rights
I have read this statement of my
rights and I understand what my rights
are. I am willing to make a statement and
answer questions. I do not want a lawyer
at this time. I understand and know what
I am doing. No promises or threats have
been made to me and no pressure or
coercion of any kind has been used against
me.
Defendant signed these statements, indicating that he had
been afforded his sixth amendment right to counsel at the
time his confession was taken, and he noted at the
preliminary hearing that the signatures appeared to be his
own. Accordingly, defendant's claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel are, for the most part, without merit.
Notwithstanding the above, we conclude that manifest
error was committed during the penalty phase. In State v.
Wood,32 we held that "[i]n a capital penalty proceeding, it
is essential that the sentencing authority consider and weigh
only proper mitigating and aggravating factors.*33 In that
case, the trial court during the penalty phase relied upon
the ruthlessness and brutality of the murder as an aggravating factor in the weighing process. The sentencing judge
had considered the factor under the general provision in Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (Supp. 1988) authorizing the trier of
fact to consider "any other facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty.* Despite that statutory language, we
ruled that consideration of such an indefinite and uncertain
standard as "ruthlessness and brutality" was impermissible.34
In doing so, we cited Godfrey v. Georgia35 as support.
Therein, the United States Supreme Court set aside a death
sentence based on an aggravating factor that the murder was
"outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman."
Godfrey held that the aggravating factor had to be narrowed
to meet constitutional standards because it described all
32. 648 P.2d 71.
33. Id. at 85.
34. Id. at 86; see also State v. Tuttle, 106 Utah Adv. 6
(April 12, 1989).
35. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).

murders and allowed the jury unlimited discretion in imposing
the death penalty.36
After ve issued our opinion in Wood, the legislature
enacted Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(q) (Supp. 1988) ('subsection (l)(g)")# apparently to avoid such constitutional
infirmity. That subsection classifies criminal homicide as
first degree murder when the homicide is "committed in an
especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally
depraved manner, any of which must be demonstrated by
physical torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily
injury of the victim before death." (Emphasis added.)
At trial in the instant case, the jury was
instructed that it could convict defendant of first degree
murder if it found that the intentional or knowing homicide
was "committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or
exceptionally depraved manner." It was never properly
instructed in either the guilt or the penalty phase that Utah
law expressly requires that such factor "must be demonstrated
by physical torture, serious physical abuse, or serious
bodily injury of the victim before death." The jury then
determined that the murder was committed "in an especially
heinous, atrocious, cruel or exceptionally depraved manner."
During the penalty phase, the jury was instructed that it
could consider the aggravating factors it had already found
in the guilt phase in determining the appropriate penalty.
Defendant now claims that the failure to properly instruct
the jury during the guilt phase permitted them to improperly
find the existence of the subsection (1)(q) aggravating
circumstance and to then consider that erroneous finding when
determining the penalty. This, defendant claims, was
manifest error.
In response, the State concedes that failure to
properly instruct the jury invalidated the jury's reliance on
subsection (1)(q) as a basis for finding defendant guilty of
capital murder. However, as the State properly notes, this
instructional error does not require reversal of defendant's
first degree murder conviction since the jury, in addition to
finding the existence of the subsection (1)(q) circumstance,
specifically found that the murder was also committed in
connection with an aggravated burglary under subsection
76-5-202(1)(d). This determination alone was sufficient to
support defendant's conviction.37
The issue is different, however, when the death
sentence imposed by the jury in the penalty hearing is
36.
37.
P.2d
1307

446 U.S. at 428-29, 433; Wood, 648 P.2d at 86.
See Bishop, 753 P.2d at 478-79; State v. Johnson, 740
1264, 1268 (Utah 1987); State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301,
(Utah 1986).
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considered. Defendant claims that there is a reasonable
probability that absent the erroneous finding of the
subsection (1)(q) circumstance, the jury would not have
imposed the death penalty. The defense contends that this
uncertainty must invalidate defendant's death sentence. He
agree under the circumstances of this case.
During the penalty phase, the jury was instructed in
part that it could
consider as aggravating circumstances the
very matters which were aggravating
circumstances in the guilt phase,
specifically that the defendant committed
the murder of Eva Oleson during the
commission of or an attempt to commit
aggravated burglary and that the murder
was committed in an especially heinous,
atrocious and cruel manner.
This language, reinforced by comments of the prosecutor
during the penalty phase, can be viewed as explicitly
instructing the jury to consider the subsection (1)(q)
circumstance previously found to exist during the guilt phase
on the basis of the erroneous instruction. In view of this
fact, the sentencing jury, due to the infirmity of the
instructions on subsection (1)(q), was likely unable to
exercise its judgment about "the suitable disposition of
• . . defendant under the circumstances particular to him and
his crime, after the facts establishing his guilt have been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."38 In effect, then, the
improper instructions denied this jury the opportunity to
properly determine whether the mitigating factors were
"sufficiently strong when compared with the aggravating
factors to create a substantial and reasonable doubt that the
death penalty is appropriate."39
Importantly, a fundamental objective of this Court
in such cases is to protect against "the imposition of a
death penalty where there existed a reasonable doubt about
the pervasive value of and weight to be given to the mitigating factors found bv the trial court as opposed to the
aggravating factors."*& Given the erroneous instruction, it
is impossible for us to determine or presume that the jury
properly performed its weighing function. Because we cannot
conclude that defendant was not prejudiced by the subsection
Wl
State v. Andrews, 677 P.2d 81, 84 (Utah 1983).
39. Id. at 83 (quoting Wood, 648 P.2d at 78); cf. Maynard v.
Cartwrlght, 486 U.S.
, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988) (as applied
in the case, the statutory aggravating circumstance was
unconstitutionally vague).
40. Andrews, 677 P.2d at 84.
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(1)(g) instructional error and its effective incorporation
into the penalty
phase, ve remand for new sentencing proceedings.*142 In doing so, it is to be observed that in State
v. Tuttle, decided after the submission of this case, we
also discussed the application of subsection (1)(q). However,
that case does not apply here since we conclude that the jury
was not properly instructed on the subsection (1)(g)
aggravating circumstance at the guilt phase and it would be
improper to make reference to that statutory aggravating
circumstance in the penalty phase on remand.
We have reviewed defendant's other claims raised on
appeal and find them to be without merit.

WE CONCUR:

Richard C. Howe, Associate
Chief Justice

I. Daniel Stewart, Justice

Christine M. Durham, Justice

Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice

41.
42.

Utah Code Ann. f 76-3-207(4) (Supp. 1988).
106 Utah Adv. Rap. 6 (April 12, 1989).
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